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Abstract 
 Chinese citizens are accustomed to dealing with risk and making 
choices about how to get things done. Such choices are evident in 
popular responses to hypothetical situations corresponding to three 
typical unethical practices in Chinese hospitals: overprescribing 
medicines not covered by insurance, encouraging patients to take 
unnecessary diagnostic tests, and taking bribes (“red envelopes” or hong 
bao) for treatment which has already formally been paid for.  Using 
nationally representative survey data, this study examines public 
perceptions of the likelihood of encountering these practices in local 
county or district hospitals as well as preferences between different 
strategies for dealing with them. We develop and test hypotheses about 
the social structural determinants of preferred strategies: focussing on 
urban versus rural contexts, level of development, gender, age, 
education and income.  The conclusion considers the implications of the 
findings for policies designed to mitigate unethical practices. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In China inappropriate incentive structures have encouraged 
health care providers to systematically offer treatment which is not 
medically indicated and to take extra money for treatment which has 
already been paid for. Three practices by Chinese doctors and hospitals 
have been widely reported: unnecessary diagnostic testing, over-
prescription of medicine, and the taking of bribes (“red envelopes” or 
hong bao) (French 2006; Li 2006; LaFraniere 2010). Such practices are not 
only unethical but also inflate health care costs, pose health risks to 
patients, and are inconsistent with broader public health goals. Yip et al. 
(2010: 1121f) cite the following examples:  health care costs have been 
rising by 16% per year over the past 20 years; 75% of patients with 
common colds are prescribed antibiotics, compared to a worldwide 
average of 30%, substantially raising the risks of antibiotic resistance; 
and all this is occurring against a background of “epidemiological 
transition” in which the burden of chronic diseases relative to infectious 
diseases is increasing, setting a premium on effective preventive 
medicine and primary care.  
 Agency risks arise whenever the interests of principals (patients) 
potentially diverge from those of their agents (physicians) and the costs 
to the principals of ensuring the agents’ protection of their interests are 
prohibitively high (Buchanan 1988: 318; Ryan 1994; Ha 2009). For 
patients and their families the dilemma is: how can they ensure that the 
doctors offer the same quality of care as they would provide for 
themselves or their own family? In principle, different strategies are 
available to resolve this dilemma with different implications for the 
behaviour of health care providers for whom patient satisfaction is an 
important performance criterion. 
In this paper, we focus not on provider incentives as most 
previous studies in this area have done, but on attitudes amongst the 
wider public to unethical practices and in particular on popular 
strategies aimed at reducing agency risks. We aim to understand the 
distribution across Chinese society of preferences between strategies. We 
do this through an examination of data from a survey conducted by the 
authors in 31 provinces of mainland China from November 2012 to 
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January 2013. We analyse the differences between strategies on a 
conceptual level as follows.  First is the extent to which the strategy 
proactively engages with or changes the situation.  In other words, we 
can distinguish empowered from passive strategies.  Second is the extent 
to which the basis of the exchange presumed under the strategy is 
particularistic, that is, it helps the particular patient but not others in a 
similar situation. The opposite tendency is universalism which implies a 
presumption that everyone in a similar situation should be treated the 
same way.  The third dimension distinguishes strategies aimed at 
changing the providers’ behaviour, as opposed to simply changing 
providers. That is, it echoes Hirschman’s (1970) contrast between using 
“voice” to improve the terms of a relationship and “exit” which replaces 
it with another relationship. 1  Hirschman’s third category, “loyalty” 
corresponds to the behaviour of patients who do what doctors indicate. 
The different dimensions involved in citizens’ choice of strategy are 
summarized below (Table 1).  
 
Table 1.  THREE DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING THE 
AGENCY DILEMMA 
 Universalistic Particularistic 
 Voice Exit Voice Exit 
Proactive Make a 
formal 
complaint  
Change 
provider 
Pay a bribe,  
Ask the 
provider to 
change their 
decision 
Use 
connections 
to find 
another 
provider 
  Passive Accept the treatment without resolving the dilemma, 
Don’t know, 
Give up treatment 
Source: Text above. 
 
                                           
1. When we refer to “exit” we don’t necessarily refer to use of private health care 
providers in place of public ones, since publicly owned providers can also be 
induced to compete in markets, too. Even changing doctors within one hospital can 
count as “exit” in this sense. 
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 We argue that citizens’ preferences for resolving the agency 
dilemma have different implications for “diagnosing” the problems of 
China’s health sector as well as understanding patient behaviour.  
Passive responses involving either acceptance of whatever the health 
care provider offers or some kind of confused or inappropriate response 
may indicate that patients are “disempowered” whilst proactive 
strategies implies that patients have more influence over the terms of 
their relationship with providers. If the system works like a Weberian 
bureaucracy, we would expect particularism to be marginal, and the 
making of formal complaints to be the standard response of patients 
faced with unsatisfactory service. Voice implies that there is flexibility in 
provider behaviour whereas exit implies that only changing providers 
can resolve the dilemma. 
In the remainder of this paper, we will first summarize recent 
developments in ethics and incentive structures; second, present 
evidence from our survey concerning the perceived extent of three types 
of unethical medical practice and the popularity of different strategies 
for dealing with them; third, develop hypotheses about the distribution 
of preferences between strategies across Chinese society; and fourth, 
examine bivariate relationships as an initial test of the hypotheses.  In 
the conclusion, we will speculate on the implications of the analysis for 
attempts to mitigate patients’ agency risks and describe directions for 
future research.   
 
II. MEDICAL ETHICS AND INCENTIVE STRUCTURES IN CHINA 
 The Ministry of Health’s response to the recognition of medical 
ethics as a problem area in the 1980s was to introduce first the 
“Regulations for Hospital Workers” (1981) which emphasised that 
health care workers should “carry forward the spirit of healing the 
wounded and rescuing the dying, sympathise with and respect the 
patients and serve the people wholeheartedly” (Z. Gao et al. 2002: 47). 
The next step was to introduce a code of conduct (MOH 1988). This code 
exhorted medical personnel to put the interests of patients first in the 
name of socialist humanitarianism (shehuizhuyi de rendao zhuyi), respect 
the patients’ rights and treat them equally regardless of nationality, 
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gender, profession, position or financial condition, be courteous and 
considerate, avoid using medicine for selfish gain, respect patients’ 
confidentiality, be collegiate and strive continually to improve their 
knowledge and skills. It thus provided a broad normative framework. 
The same year the Chinese Society of Medical Ethics, affiliated to the 
Chinese Medical Association, was also founded. The Chinese debate 
about medical ethics, conducted in two journals, Yixue yu zhexue 
(Medicine and Philosophy) founded in 1980 and Zhongguo yixue lunlixue 
(Chinese Medical Ethics) founded in 1988, has largely revolved around the 
principles of the code of conduct and different methods of 
institutionalizing it in systems for training medical personnel and 
assessing their performance, including the establishment of effective 
incentive structures and monitoring systems (such as ethics committees) 
within hospitals and the health care administration more broadly (Ip 
2005:  178; Z. Gao, et al. 2002:49). In 1993, the MOH ordered that medical 
ethics should be included in the curricula of higher schools of medicine, 
at least as an option. In 1998, the NPC passed a law on the licensing of 
physicians spelling out their moral duties and in 1999 medical ethics 
became a compulsory subject for licensed physicians’ examinations (Z. 
Gao et al. 2002: 47f). The same year the MOH issued further 
“Regulations for the Morality of Medical Employees” (Ke 2002: 61). 
 Medical ethical education in China has suffered from deeper 
problems, including lack of training in higher skills such as independent 
judgment and critical thinking with the result that graduates lack an 
ethical sensibility; teaching typically involved preaching about rules of 
conduct often in the framework of political and ideological education, 
with little concern for the issues that worry ordinary citizens and 
especially underprivileged groups (Nie 2002:64f). Chinese medical 
ethicists have recognized that their subject encompasses “the socialistic 
macro view of health for all” (Z. Gao et al. 2002: 52f) implying shared 
responsibility of the government, the medical profession and individuals 
for public and individual health, as well as recognition of the 
contribution of medical ethics to social stability (Z. Gao et al. 2002; 54). 
In other words, medical ethics is not seen to include not only the 
morality of physicians as demonstrated in their professional conduct, 
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but also considerations of the implications of medical technology and 
the ethics of health care policies (Ke 2002: 58). 
 In the 1980s and 1990s lacklustre ethics training coincided with 
the introduction of market-oriented reforms, leading to changes in the 
doctor-patient relationship and a general weakening of moral 
responsibility in the society (Liu, Han et al. 2002; Ip 2005).  The market is 
sometimes presented as the source of an unwelcome change in values 
and in the terms of doctors’ relationships with patients: whereas in the 
socialist system doctors saw their role as “serving the people,” once 
market reforms were introduced, health care became a commodity like 
any other. Those with more money “consumed” more and better care, 
and doctors focussed on serving them, with the result that resources 
were redistributed in a way that was, from the point of view of the 
collective interest in better health for all, irrational (Ip 2005:  178f).  
 Focussing on professional conduct, Fan Ruiping (2007) argues 
that the problem has not been market reforms per se but the distorting 
effects of government policies in a commercialized system of state-
owned hospitals: namely the low salaries of doctors, hospitals’ practice 
of providing bonus payments to doctors for prescribing expensive drugs 
or procedures, and the ban on direct payments from patients to doctors 
for higher quality care. According to Fan (2007, 125f) bonus payments 
have been linked to the amount of revenue generated by the physicians’ 
department and hospital, and in big cities these bonuses are thought to 
have often equalled or exceeded basic salary. Under this system, for 
most public hospitals approximately one half of total hospital revenue 
came from drug sales. There have also been cases where pharmaceutical 
companies have entered into illegal deals with hospitals or physicians to 
provide kickbacks in proportion to the amount of drugs prescribed. The 
underlying problem was a government-prescribed fee schedule which 
set the prices for some labour-intensive services such as general 
consultation below cost, whilst allowing hospitals to set prices for 
technology-intensive services above cost and also charge a 15% mark-up 
on drug sales (Yip et al. 2010: 1121; Yip et al. 2012: 840). Fan (2007) 
argues that solutions to the ethics problems may be found in the 
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development of a “Confucian” approach to remuneration of physicians.2 
Claiming that a positive regard for justified remuneration is evident in 
the Analects and Mencius, Fan (2007: 119f) suggests that this means 
recognizing that higher quality work deserves higher pay, and that there 
is no conflict between receiving high pay for high quality work and the 
ethical intention of helping patients. Essentially, this involves embracing 
market principles within a humanitarian framework, and recognizing 
the utopianism of a socialist morality which presumes that highly skilled 
physicians should take a low salary for the public good. However, aside 
from liberalizing pay scales this “Confucian” approach does not contain 
solutions to the problems with incentive structures which Fan identifies. 
As Döring (2002: 76) puts it “A medical system governed by reason and 
ethics might well allow and encourage commercial profits, but it will at 
the same time contain them and make them serve the overall welfare of 
the people.” Chinese medical ethicists have acknowledged real 
inconsistencies between the aspirational declarations in official codes 
and the real incentive structures which exacerbate price inflation and 
unethical practices (Z. Gao et al. 2002: 51). 
The Chinese government has made a number of experiments to 
change the incentive structures (Yip et al. 2010: 1121f) including some 
which have been rolled out nationwide as part of the three-year $850 
billion health care reform package announced in April 2009 (Yip et al. 
2012). A particular focus of reform has been China’s primary care sector. 
Experiments carried out with urban community health centres in 
Shanghai suggested that prospective payment and performance-related 
pay were able to deliver cost control, although their benefits in the 
management of chronic diseases were harder to assess (Yip et al. 2010: 
1124). In rural Shaanxi, a scheme to pay village doctors a salary and a 
performance-related bonus, combined with centralized purchasing of 
drugs, reduced costs and unnecessary prescriptions whilst increasing 
                                           
2. As an example of Confucian reasoning, Fan (2007: 120) paraphrases Mencius as 
follows: “When a student challenged Mencius concerning whether a gentleman 
could live a luxurious life, Mencius replied: if there not be a proper ground for 
taking it, a single bowl of rice may not be received; if there be such a proper ground, 
receiving all-under-Heaven is not to be considered excessive.” See also Lee (2002). 
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utilization of formal health care (Yip et al. 2010: 1125). Following these 
successes, in 2009 the government began paying primary health care 
providers a fixed per capita fee to deliver a defined package of basic 
public health services to the population in their catchment areas, 
introduced a zero-profit drug policy for primary health care providers 
(but not hospitals), and tied the allocation of their public health budget 
to an annual performance assessment (Yip et al. 2012: 834). It introduced 
a National Essential Medicine List to cap prices for the most needed 
drugs and ensure that all these medicines count for reimbursement, with 
competitive bidding between suppliers organized at province level 
(Docherty et al 2012; Yip et al. 2012: 834). Media reports suggest the 
bidding process is still plagued by corruption (Yip et al. 2012: 837). A 
Ministry of Health report suggests the use of essential medicines lists 
has not so far effectively reduced over-prescribing (Yip et al. 2012: 838f).  
Many local governments, on whom the task of implementing the 
reforms falls, lack the capacity and data to assess the performance of 
providers. Nevertheless, the 2009-2012 reforms may represent a sea-
change for primary care in China. Eventually, the government hopes 
that primary health care providers will play their proper role as gate 
keepers for more specialized services in hospitals. 
Reforming the governance of public hospitals, which provide 90% 
of inpatient and outpatient services, is proving much more difficult 
partly due to the competing priorities of different branches of 
government (Yip et al. 2012: 835ff). The government has designated 16 
cities to experiment with different governance models. Although these 
models vary considerably, all cities have instituted monitoring measures 
to control over-prescribing and over-testing; and hospitals in these cities 
have increased discretionary power to hire, fire and promote staff, 
relaxing civil service rules which guarantee doctors job security.  Two of 
the cities, Kunming and Luoyang, prioritized the introduction of market 
competition between public and private hospitals by privatizing public 
hospitals. Case-based charging began to be encouraged by the Ministry 
of Health as early as 2004. An experiment involving treatment protocols 
in Jining appears to have been successful in reducing costs by as much 
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as 33% (Yip et al. 2010: 1125f).  The Ministry has started to implement 
case-based payment with treatment protocols nationwide.  
Given all these efforts at reform, we would expect to find that 
some of the problems with incentive structures cited in the literature 
have now been ameliorated. However, in nearly all Chinese cities, 
hospitals still retain their profits and physician bonuses are still linked to 
profits (Yip et al. 2012: 838). Moreover, any incentive structure will 
remain open to abuse through manipulation and misreporting if ethical 
standards remain lax. In the Chinese saying, shang you zhengce, xia you 
duice (above they have policies, below we have counter measures). In its 
battle to reform the incentive structures which encourage unethical 
practices, the government needs allies, not the least of whom is the 
general public. It is to our data about public attitudes that we now turn.  
 
III. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 This study is based on analysis of data from a nationwide survey 
commissioned by the authors in mainland China from 1 November 2012 
to 17 January 20133.  Fieldwork was carried out by the Research Center 
for Contemporary China at Peking University. The target population 
was mainland citizens age 18 to 70 residing for more than 30 days in 
family dwellings in all 31 provinces. The survey used the GPS Assisted 
Area Sampling Method (Landry and Shen 2005). Stratification took place 
in stages. At the first stage, the country was divided into three official 
macro-regions, Eastern, Central and Western; each macro-region was 
divided into urban and rural administrative areas, giving six layers in 
total; 60 primary sampling units (PSU) corresponding to county-level 
administrative divisions were selected at random across the six layers 
with probability proportionate to population. Within each PSU, three 
half-square minutes (HSM) of latitude and longitude were chosen with 
probability proportionate to population density, within each of these, 
again proportionate to population density, a number of spatial square 
seconds (SSS) corresponding to 90m x 90m squares was selected at 
                                           
3. Performance Evaluations, Trust and Utilization of Health Care in China Survey, 
2012-13. Funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council, Grant No. 
ES/J011487/1. More information at http://www.gla.ac.uk/petu. 
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random. Within each SSS, all dwellings were enumerated, and 27 were 
selected in each HSM by systematic sampling. Within each dwelling 
respondents were identified by the Kish method. The result was a 
sample of 5,424 dwellings in which 3,684 valid interviews were 
completed, giving a response rate of 67.9 per cent. 
To get an estimate of how widespread unethical medical practices 
are in China, we asked survey respondents how likely it is that in their 
local city or county hospital medical staff would unnecessarily prescribe 
medicines not covered by insurance, take bribes or “red envelopes” 
(hong bao) for treatment which has already formally been paid for, and 
require comprehensive check-ups from patients even when the 
diagnosis is clear (Figure 1). The last practice appears to be the most 
common: 61 per cent consider it very or somewhat likely; 57 per cent 
consider unnecessary prescription of medicines not covered by 
insurance to be very or somewhat likely; and only 30 per cent consider 
bribe-taking to be likely. A substantial proportion of respondents say 
“don’t know”, but for each question less than 2 per cent refuse to 
answer. Bribe taking is considered unlikely by 57 per cent, unnecessary 
comprehensive check-ups and prescriptions not covered by insurance by 
28 per cent each. The data suggest that medically unethical behaviour is 
relatively common, at least in the eyes of Chinese citizens.  
We can combine the three questions into an index to see whether 
respondents who see unethical behaviour as likely in one situation see it 
in all situations. This procedure shows that 28 per cent of respondents 
do not see unethical behaviour as likely in any situation, 20 per cent see 
it as likely in one situation, 28 per cent see it as likely in two situations 
and 24 per cent see it as likely in three situations.  The data thus imply 
that a large majority of respondents see unethical behaviour as likely at 
least some of the time, and a substantial minority see it as endemic. 
Our survey included three items prompting respondents to 
recommend one course of action to deal with unethical behaviour by 
doctors.  For each, we asked respondents to choose amongst several 
strategies which differ along the main dimensions discussed above 
(Table 1): the extent to which they are proactive or passive, universalistic 
or particularistic and whether they involve voice or exit.  
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Figure 1. PERCEIVED PREVALENCE OF UNETHICAL MEDICAL PRACTICES
Source: Performance Evaluations, Trust and Utilization of Health Care in China Survey, 
2012‐13. Funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council, Grant No. 
ES/J011487/1. Fieldwork 1 November 2012‐17 January 2013, N=3,684.
Q. Some people say medical ethics is a big problem in this country, but others say such reports 
are just exaggerated. Judging from your own personal experience, how likely do you think it is 
that you would encounter the following types of situations in city or county hospitals around 
here?
a)  Prescribing medicines not covered by insurance even when effective alternatives 
covered by insurance are available
b) Taking bribes (“red envelopes” or hongbao) for treatment which has already formally 
been paid for.
c) Requiring comprehensive check‐ups from patients even when the diagnosis is perfectly 
clear.
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The data show that in dealing with a surgeon who tells the patient 
that he cannot guarantee the success of a life-saving operation, almost 
one third of respondents say that they would recommend just 
undergoing the operation at one’s own risk (Figure 2). The second most 
popular strategy, recommended by just over one quarter, is to change to 
another public hospital.  Using connections to find another surgeon is 
the third most popular strategy, chosen by one in ten respondents. 
Paying a bribe is the recommendation of less than one in twenty, as is 
going to a private hospital. Only three per cent would recommend 
making a formal complaint and the same number give other replies. 
Slightly less than one in six say “don’t know”, and we combine them 
with the one per cent who give no answer. 
If a doctor prescribes a lot of expensive medicine which is not 
covered by insurance, even when cheaper alternatives are available, 
slightly less than a quarter of respondents would just buy the medicine 
prescribed. The same number would just ask the doctor to change it; just 
over one in eight recommend changing to another public hospital. 
Around half as many would try a private hospital. Less than one in ten 
would complain to the hospital administration. Only one in twenty 
would resort to use of connections; less than half that number would 
pay a bribe; and other strategies are also marginal. Around one in six 
say don’t know, including a handful who give no answer. 
If a public hospital appears to be requiring unnecessary diagnostic 
tests, a bit less than one third would recommend doing the tests 
anyway, just under one in five think that asking the doctor to keep the 
tests to a minimum would suffice. Slightly less than one in eight would 
recommend changing to another public hospital.  Less than one in ten 
would complain to the hospital administration. Just over one in twenty 
would use connections to find another doctor.  Just over one in twenty 
volunteer other replies, and when we look at these in more detail, we 
find that nearly all of them recommend just refusing to do the tests. 
Only one in fifty think bribery would help. Around one in six are don’t 
knows, with whom we combine the few who give no answer. 
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Figure 2. PREFERRED STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH UNETHICAL MEDICAL PRACTICES
Q. If your friend needed a life‐saving operation but the surgeon in a public hospital told them 
that he could not guarantee that the operation would be successful, what would you advise the 
patient to do? (One answer).
b) What would you advise your friend to do if the doctor at a public hospital prescribes 
a lot of expensive medication which is not covered by insurance even when cheaper 
alternatives are available? (One answer)
c) What would you advise your friend to do if he thinks doctors in a public hospital are 
requiring him to do unnecessary diagnostic tests? (One answer)
(% replies)
Source: Performance Evaluations, Trust and Utilization of Health Care in China Survey, 
2012‐13. Funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council, Grant No. 
ES/J011487/1. Fieldwork 1 November 2012‐17 January 2013, N=3,684.
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Again, we can combine the replies to different questions to get an 
overall picture of the popularity of different types of strategies and to 
see to what extent respondents choose one type of strategy across 
situations.  Three types of strategies are main-stream, although none is 
consistently endorsed by a majority of respondents. The most popular 
overall is to simply accept the treatment recommended by the doctor 
without question: nine per cent would do recommend it in all three 
situations, 15 per cent in two situations, 25 per cent would in one 
situation, and a bare majority, 51 per cent, would never recommend it.  
Although least costly in terms of hassle, this “loyalty” option is not a 
way of reducing agency risks.  Changing to another public hospital is 
the second most popular strategy overall: four per cent would 
recommend it in all three situations, six per cent would recommend it in 
two, 26 per cent would recommend it in one situation, and 64 per cent 
would never recommend it. Asking the doctor to modify his or her 
behaviour or the treatment regime is the third most popular strategy: 
only one per cent would recommend it in three situations, 11 per cent 
would recommend it in two, 22 per cent would in one situation, and 66 
per cent would never recommend it. Four fifths of respondents would 
use one of these mainstream strategies at least once. 
Four types of strategies are marginal. These include use of 
connections (guanxi) to find another provider. Only two per cent are 
consistent connections users (guanxihu), the same percentage would 
recommend it in two situations, 11 per cent would recommend it in one 
situation, and as many as 85 per cent would never recommend guanxi as 
a way of dealing with unethical medical practices. Just over one per cent 
would recommend going to a private hospital in two or three situations, 
just over nine per cent would recommend it in one situation and 89 per 
cent, would never recommend going to a private hospital. Consistent 
complainers are less than two per cent, three per cent would recommend 
complaining in two situations, six per cent in one situation and 89 per 
cent would never recommend complaining to the hospital 
administration. Paying bribes is the most marginal strategy of all: only 
one per cent would recommend it in two or three situations, four per 
cent would recommend it one situation, and just over 94 per cent would 
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never recommend it. Although these are all marginal strategies, more 
than one third of respondents choose at least one of them once. 
 
IV. HYPOTHESES 
Since decentralization and marketization have been significant 
trends in China’s provision of social services (Chan, Ngok et al. 2008), 
both household resources and level of development of the community 
have been significant factors in determining the availability and quality 
of health care (Henderson and et al. 1995; Liu 2004; Adams and Hannum 
2005; Liu, Zhang et al. 2007; Eggleston, Li et al. 2008). Urban-rural 
inequality and inequality between communities have grown against a 
background of overall improvement in health facilities and outcomes 
(Gao, Qian et al. 2002; Akin, Dow et al. 2005; Reddy 2008). For poor rural 
residents lack of access has often meant doing without desperately 
needed treatment (Li 2008; Lora-Wainwright 2011).  In his research on 
strategies to obtain a government permit, Munro (2012: 164-7) found that 
rural respondents were less likely than urban respondents to use 
connections and less likely to write a letter to an official: in other words, 
they were less proactive. If the same applies in the dealing with doctors, 
we would expect (H1) urban residents to be more proactive than rural 
residents in dealing with unethical behaviour by health care providers. 
Related to urban-rural difference is level of economic 
development. Doug Guthrie (1999) made the case that economic 
development encourages the establishment of rational-legal authority. 
Munro (2012: 164-7) didn’t find strong effects from level of development 
on strategies to obtain a government permit: GDP per capita of the city 
or county was not a significant influence. An infrastructure measure, 
based on the utilities available in the area, showed that there was a weak 
relationship between underdevelopment and passivity, and that people 
in communities at a medium level of development were slightly more 
inclined to use universalistic strategies. We propose to test the following 
hypothesis in relation to unethical medical practices: (H2a) residents in 
more developed areas are more proactive than residents in less developed areas.  
We also need to consider that there is a legitimate market for health care 
services providing people with choices, or in other words options for 
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exit from a relationship with a particular physician if it proves 
unsatisfactory. We therefore propose to test whether (H2b) residents in 
more developed areas are more likely to use exit strategies than those in less 
developed areas. 
We know from prior research that Chinese men more readily take 
part in non-electoral politics than Chinese women (Tong 2003: 142ff). 
This conforms to traditional gender stereotypes.  Munro’s research 
(2012: 164-7) on preferred strategies for obtaining a government permit 
found that men were more likely to use particularistic strategies, but not 
necessarily more proactive. We can test the following hypotheses in 
regard to strategies for dealing with unethical health care providers: 
(H3a) men are more proactive; and (H3b) men are more inclined to 
particularism. 
Under Mao, China’s governing ideology was ascetic and 
egalitarian. Yang (1994: 146ff) suggested that the money fever which 
began in the 1980s stimulated the rise of particularistic strategies. 
Generational differences in socialization may generate different 
normative expectations about the acceptability of for example using 
connections to get what one wants.  Munro (2012: 164-7) found that 
those born in the 1940s and earlier were less inclined to particularism, 
but also less inclined to universalistic voice, that is to utilizing 
bureaucratic channels of appeal, as were those born in the 1950s. In 
relation to strategies for dealing with unethical health care providers, we 
can test the following hypotheses: (H4a) the oldest cohorts are less inclined 
to particularism and (H4b) they are less inclined to voice. 
It is well established that education enhances social capital (Lin 
2001: 23). We would expect education to provide both the social skills 
and opportunities to get to know people in positions of authority and 
learn how to deal with them (Wank 1999: 129). We know that education 
and income correlate strongly. The richer and better educated people 
are, the more confidence they are likely to have in dealing with medical 
professionals. We would therefore expect: (H5a) the better educated and the 
higher the income of the respondent, the more proactive they are in dealing with 
unethical medical practices. In Munro’s (2012: 164-7) multivariate analysis, 
education was found to be insignificant when income was controlled, 
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but income on its own significantly increased the tendency to use 
particularistic strategies. DiFranceisco and Gitelman’s (1984: 612) study 
of Soviet émigrés in the late 1970s and 1980s suggested education was a 
positive influence on use of connections. We can test the following 
hypothesis: (H5b) the more educated and the higher the income of the 
respondent, the greater the tendency to rely on particularism. Education and 
income usually confer purchasing power, which gives people additional 
choices in terms of health care provision. In a commercialized system, 
we would expect (H5c) the more educated and the higher the income of the 
respondent, the greater the tendency to use exit strategies. 
 
V. ANALYSIS 
 In order to identify patterns in bivariate relationships between 
preferred strategies and independent variables corresponding to our 
hypotheses, we run cross tabulations by social structure and compute 
mean household income against different strategies. This procedure 
allows us to identify the statistically significant differences between the 
categories and shows that some hypotheses fail, in the sense that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis, whilst others pass (Table 2). Of course, 
a bivariate analysis detects gross rather than net effects. Multivariate 
analyses will be needed to identify net effects of individual variables, 
but from a policy viewpoint, understanding gross effects is often more 
important than developing a multivariate model, and it is in any case the 
prior step. 
 In China, counties (xian) are rural areas, county-level cities are 
smaller cities, whilst bigger cities are divided into urban districts (qu), 
and these administrative categories correspond respectively to 45 per 
cent, 17 per cent and 38 per cent of our sample. If Hypothesis 1 is correct, 
we would expect that urban district respondents would be more likely 
to choose the proactive strategies of making a formal complaint, 
changing providers, paying a bribe, pleading with the provider or using 
connections to find another provider, and less likely to either accept the 
treatment offered, give up treatment or say don’t know.  Cross-
tabulation shows that compared to rural respondents urban dwellers are 
indeed  consistently  more  likely  to  complain or to use connections and 
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Table 2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM BIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 Surgery Over-
prescription 
Unnecessary 
tests 
(H1) Urban residents are more proactive 
than rural residents in dealing with 
unethical behaviour by health care 
providers. 
Fail* Fail Fail 
(H2a) Residents in more developed areas 
are more proactive than those in less 
developed areas. 
Pass** Fail Fail 
(H2b) Residents in more developed areas 
are more likely to use exit strategies than 
those in less developed areas. 
Pass Pass Fail 
(H3a) Men are more proactive than 
women 
Fail Fail Fail 
(H3b) Men are more likely than women to 
use particularistic strategies. 
Fail Fail Fail 
(H4a) The oldest cohorts are less inclined 
to particularism. 
Pass Pass Pass 
(H4b) The oldest cohorts are less inclined 
to voice. 
Fail Pass Pass 
(H5a) The more educated and the higher 
the income of the respondent, the more 
proactive they are in dealing with 
unethical practices. 
Pass Pass Pass 
(H5b) The more educated and the higher 
the income of the respondent, the greater 
the tendency to rely on particularism. 
Fail Fail Fail 
(H5c) The more educated and the higher 
the income of the respondent, the greater 
the tendency to use exit strategies. 
Pass Fail Fail 
    
* Fail=fail to reject the null hypothesis; **Pass=reject the null hypothesis. 
Source: Cross-tabulations reported in the Appendices 
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less likely to say don’t know (see Appendices 1 to 3 for details). For 
example in the case of surgery, 14 per cent of urban respondents would 
use connections as against eight per cent of rural respondents, giving a 
difference of six per cent (P<.001), five per cent would complain as 
against three per cent of rural respondents (difference P<.05) and 11 per 
cent say don’t know as against 18 per cent of rural respondents (P<.001). 
Urban respondents are also more likely to change to a private hospital 
for surgery: five per cent versus three per cent (P<.001). However, urban 
and rural respondents do not significantly differ in the likelihood of 
simply accepting what the health care provider offers, and in terms of 
willingness to change to another public hospital, rural respondents are 
more active in the cases of surgery and over-prescription. On the basis of 
this evidence, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that urban and rural 
respondents are equally proactive. Instead, they appear to be proactive 
in different ways. 
 Our survey asked respondents about the availability of four public 
utilities in the respondent’s home: electricity, running water, LPG gas 
and an internet connection. More than 99 per cent had electricity but 
only 84 per cent had running water, 64 per cent had gas, and 44 per cent 
had an internet connection. Since these facilities rely on publicly 
provided infrastructure, we use them to construct an infrastructure 
index measuring the level of development of the local area. If 
Hypothesis 2a is correct, we would expect that respondents in areas with 
maximum utilities would be more likely to choose proactive strategies 
and less likely to say don’t know or just accept the treatment offered.  
Cross-tabulation shows that this is broadly true in the case of surgery 
but not the other two situations (see Appendices 4 to 6 for details). For 
example, in dealing with an unethical surgeon, only 27 per cent of those 
in the most developed areas would undergo the operation at their own 
risk compared to 48 per cent in the least developed (P<.001), and nine 
per cent say don’t know compared to 16 per cent in the least developed 
(P<.001).  However, in the other two situations although there are fewer 
who say don’t know in the most developed areas, there is no significant 
difference by level of development in willingness to just accept the 
treatment offered. Hence, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that in the 
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case of over-prescription and unnecessary testing, level of development 
makes no difference to how proactive respondents are. 
If Hypothesis 2b is correct, those in the most developed areas 
should be more likely to choose the exit strategies of changing providers 
and using connections, and less likely to use the voice strategies of 
making complaints and paying bribes. Cross-tabulation shows that they 
are indeed more likely to use connections and to change to another 
public hospital to avoid dealing with an unethical surgeon and with 
over-prescription. For example, in dealing with an unethical surgeon, 30 
per cent in the most developed areas would change to another public 
hospital as against 17 per cent in the least developed and 16 per cent 
would use connections as against five per cent in the least developed 
(both P<.001).  In dealing with over-prescription, 14 per cent in the most 
developed areas would change to another public hospital as against 10 
per cent in the least developed (P<.05), and nine per cent in the most 
developed areas would use connections, as against two per cent in the 
least developed areas (P<.001). In the case of dealing with unnecessary 
testing, they are also more likely to use connections: nine per cent versus 
two per cent (P<.001) but not to change hospitals. On the basis of this 
evidence, we can reject the null hypotheses that people in less developed 
and more developed areas are equally likely to choose exit strategies in 
dealing with an unethical surgeon and with over prescription, but not in 
dealing with unnecessary testing. 
 If Hypothesis 3a is correct, we would expect to find that men are 
more likely than women to complain, use connections, plead, pay bribes 
or change providers. In fact, the genders are equally likely to choose 
these strategies (see Appendix Tables 7 to 9 for details). Our survey 
shows that women are significantly more likely to say don’t know in 
response to each of the questions: this shows more circumspection but it 
is not sufficient to support the thesis that women are more passive in the 
face of unethical medical practices.  They are slightly less likely to ask 
the doctor to keep the diagnostic tests to the minimum in the case of 
unnecessary testing—18 per cent versus 21 per cent (P<.05), which 
suggests they may be more reticent. But this is too little evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis. If Hypothesis 3b is correct, we would expect 
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to find that men are more likely than women to use connections or pay 
bribes. Again, the cross tabulations show this is not the case.  
 If Hypothesis 4a is correct, and age is associated with 
universalism, we would expect to find that the oldest cohorts, those born 
in the 1940s and 1950s in our survey are less likely to use connections, 
bribe or plead with the provider. We find that across all three scenarios 
the youngest cohorts are more likely to use connections and to plead 
with the provider (see Appendix Tables 10 to 12 for details). For 
example, in dealing with unnecessary testing, seven per cent of those 
born in the 1980s and 1990s would use connections as against four per 
cent of those born in the 1940s and 1950s (P difference <.01); 23 per cent 
of the youngest cohorts would ask the doctor to keep the tests to the 
minimum as against 15 per cent of the oldest cohorts (P<.001). We 
therefore reject the null hypothesis that the generations are equally 
inclined to universalism. If Hypothesis 4b is correct, and the elderly are 
less inclined to voice, the oldest cohorts should be less inclined to 
complain to the hospital administration or pay a bribe. Younger 
complainers outnumber older complainers by two to one in the cases of 
over prescription and unnecessary testing, but not surgery.  In sum, we 
cannot reject the null for Hypothesis 4b in respect of surgery, but we can 
for over-prescription and unnecessary testing. 
 If Hypothesis 5a is correct, meaning education and income are 
associated with proactive strategies, then we would expect to find that 
more educated and richer respondents will be more likely to make a 
formal complaint, pay a bribe, plead, change provider or use 
connections to find another provider, and less likely to say don’t know 
or simply accept the treatment on the terms suggested by the physician. 
This is generally the case across all three situations examined (see 
Appendix Tables 13 to 18 for details). For example, in the case of 
surgery, we find that 20 per cent of those with university education 
would use connections as against six per cent of those with primary 
education or less; and six per cent would go to a private hospital as 
against two per cent of those with primary education or less. (P<.001 for 
both).  Just six per cent of those with university education say don’t 
know as against 27 per cent of those with primary education (P<.001); 
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and 30 per cent of those with university education would just undergo 
the operation at their own risk as against 35 per cent of those with 
primary education (P<.05); Appendix Table 13). In the case of over-
prescription, those who would complain to the hospital administration, 
use connections or ask the doctor to change the prescription have annual 
average household incomes which are respectively 20,000, 17,500 and 
8,500 yuan higher than those who would simply buy the medicine 
recommended (P<.001 for all three, Appendix Table 17).  We can 
therefore reject the null hypothesis that poorer and less educated 
respondents are equally proactive in dealing with unethical medical 
practices.  
If Hypothesis 5b is correct and privilege is associated with 
particularism, then more educated and wealthier respondents should be 
more willing to use connections, pay bribes or ask the doctor to change 
their behaviour.  We find that those with university education are more 
likely to use connections across all three situations; and in the cases of 
over-prescription and unnecessary testing, they are more likely to ask 
the doctor to change their behaviour; although there is no difference in 
bribery (Appendix Tables 13 to 15). Thus, for example, to deal with 
unnecessary testing, 11 per cent of the university educated would use 
connections, as against only three per cent of those with primary 
education or less (P difference <.001, Appendix Table 15). In the case of 
over-prescription, 29 per cent of the university educated would ask the 
doctor to change the medicine, as against only 20 per cent of those with 
primary education or less (P<.001).  Across all three situations, those 
who use connections consistently have higher average annual household 
income than those who simply accept treatment on the terms offered, as 
do in the case of surgery bribe payers and those who plead, and in the 
case of over-prescription those who plead. We can therefore reject the 
null hypothesis that richer and more educated respondents are equally 
as likely as poorer and less educated respondents to choose 
particularistic strategies. 
However, we should also note that those who choose the 
universalistic strategy of making a formal complaint are also richer than 
those who simply accept treatment. For example, in the case of 
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unnecessary testing, the mean annual household income of complainers 
is 22,200 yuan higher on average than accepters (P<.01). In the case of 
over-prescription, their income is 20,000 yuan higher (P<.001), and in the 
case of surgery it is 14,500 yuan higher (P<.01). There is an association 
between education and complaining, too: in the case of over-
prescription, 12 per cent of those with university education would 
complain as against only five per cent of those with only primary 
education (P<.001); and in the case of unnecessary testing, 10 per cent of 
those with university education would complain as against only five per 
cent of those with primary education (P<.001). So in other words, it 
seems possible that the greater propensity of the richer and more 
educated to engage in particularist strategies is a function of being more 
proactive, rather than being less inclined to universalism. 
 If Hypothesis 5c is correct, meaning privilege is associated with 
exit strategies, then more educated and higher income respondents 
should be more willing to go to private hospitals, change to another 
public hospital, or use connections to find another doctor. What we find 
is that although the university educated are more four per cent more 
likely than those with primary education to go to a private hospital for 
surgery (P difference <.001), there are no significant differences in 
preference for going private or changing hospitals in the other two 
situations.  When we look at income, we find that those who would 
change to another public hospital for surgery live in households earning 
on average 9,200 yuan more than those who would undergo the 
operation at their own risk, but there are no significant income 
differences for propensity to change public hospitals or go private in the 
other situations. As mentioned those with university education are 
consistently more likely to use connections to find another surgeon, and 
those who do so have higher incomes than those who just accept the 
treatment offered.  In the case of surgery, we can reject the null 
hypothesis that those who are more educated and have more money are 
equally as likely as the less privileged to choose exit strategies. But we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis in the other two situations. 
 
25 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 Patients, especially well-to-do patients, are part of the problem as 
well as part of the solution in unethical medical practice. Most analyses 
focus on the perverse incentive structures within Chinese hospitals that 
reward unethical practices. They are part of a culture of health care 
seeking and medical treatment in which the burden of insuring against 
agency risk, that is of ensuring that doctors act in the best interests of 
patients, is shifted onto the patients themselves.  The fact that pluralities 
of patients see no alternative but to accept the burden of risk gives little 
ground for comfort about the nature of the system. Rather it testifies to 
the existence of a trap of low expectations on the part of the public with 
respect to the medical profession. Use of particularistic rather than 
universalistic strategies to influence doctors is rational in circumstances 
where codes of conduct and formal regulations are unreliable guides to 
practice.  
 To what extent does the market provide solutions to the problem 
of unethical medical practices?  The logic of supply and demand 
suggests that more and better services should reduce the price of 
medical care and encourage exit if providers behave unethically.  We do 
not have trend data or cross-regional comparative data which would 
allow us to judge whether or not this is occurring.  However, we do have 
variations in income and levels of development, which allow us to make 
a judgment that market forces do to some extent encourage both 
activism and exit strategies in dealing with unethical surgeons.  The fact 
that the well-to-do in China are more inclined to resort to particularistic 
strategies as well cautions against any simplistic assumption that 
activism and exit necessarily operate in favour of the construction of 
universalistic institutions.   
Empowerment of patients within the public hospital system may 
offer another way of altering incentive structures and ensuring better 
enforcement of regulations. The age differences suggest a nuanced 
conclusion. On the one hand, as older cohorts die off, the demographic 
trend is towards a more assertive public. On the other hand, except in 
the case of surgery, that assertiveness is likely amongst the young to 
take a particularistic form. It is striking how few respondents believe 
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that complaining to the hospital administration does any good in 
dealing with unethical medical practices. Since the administration and 
unethical practitioners are probably in most hospitals embedded in 
circular relationships of mutual cooperation and mutual guarantees, 
patients are right to be wary of formal complaints procedures. There is a 
need for regulatory institutions which command public confidence such 
as, for example, a system of patients’ ombudsmen, perhaps chosen from 
amongst local people’s congress delegates, who stand at arm’s length 
from the hospitals, are empowered to investigate complaints and have 
real powers to punish doctors who transgress the code of conduct, and 
to reward patients who report transgressions. In other words, there is a 
need to move beyond exhortation towards enforcement.  
The present paper is no more than an initial pass through the data 
we have collected. Further analysis is needed both of the changes in 
institutional incentive structures emerging from the latest reforms and of 
the data on patient behaviour and public attitudes. The survey data 
analysed here offers the opportunity to develop predictive models of 
which patients prefer which strategies, isolating net effects of significant 
independent variables, and identifying patterns in their relationships. In 
addition, we need to systematically examine the wealth of qualitative 
and anecdotal evidence, including some collected by the authors of this 
paper, to try to understand the circumstances in which unethical 
medical practices are likely to occur and to relate this to the findings of 
our survey. Nevertheless, we believe the present study represents one of 
the first published attempts to analyse the phenomenon of unethical 
medical practices on the basis of a large body of empirical evidence.  
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Appendix Table 1. STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH UNETHICAL SURGEON: 
TABULATION BY ADMINISTRATIVE CATEGORY 
Q. If your friend needed a life-saving operation but the surgeon in a public hospital 
told them that he could not guarantee that the operation would be successful, what 
would you advise the patient to do? (One answer). 
 
All  
County 
County-
level city 
Urban 
district 
Difference: 
urban-county 
   (% respondents)  
4 Complain to the 
hospital administration 
3 3 5 2 * 
10 Use connections to find 
another surgeon 
8 8 14 6 *** 
4 Pay the surgeon extra 
money (hong bao) 
4 3 4 -1  
4 Go to a private hospital 
for better treatment 
3 3 5 2 *** 
27 Change to another 
public hospital 
29 25 26 -3 * 
4 Ask the surgeon to take 
special care 
4 4 5 1 * 
32 Undergo the operation 
at own risk 
32 32 32 0  
16 Don’t know 18 22 11 -7 *** 
Significance of difference: *. 05 level, ***. 001 level       
Source: Performance Evaluations, Trust and Utilization of Health Care in 
China Survey, 2012-13. Funded by the UK Economic and Social Research 
Council, Grant No. ES/J011487/1. Fieldwork 1 November 2012-17 January 
2013, N=3,684. 
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Appendix Table 2. STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH OVER-PRESCRIPTION: 
TABULATION BY ADMINISTRATIVE CATEGORY 
Q. What would you advise your friend to do if the doctor at a public hospital 
prescribes a lot of expensive medication which is not covered by insurance even when 
cheaper alternatives are available? (One answer) 
 
All  
County 
County-
level city 
Urban 
district 
Difference: 
urban-county 
   (% respondents) 
8 Complain to the hospital 
administration 
5 8 12 7 *** 
6 Use connections to find 
another doctor 
4 4 7 3 *** 
2 Pay the doctor extra 
money (hong bao) 
3 2 2 -1 * 
7 Go to a private hospital 
or pharmacy for the 
prescription 
7 8 7 0  
13 Change to another 
public hospital 
15 16 10 -5 *** 
24 Ask the doctor to change 
the prescription 
22 21 27 4 ** 
24 Buy the medicine 
prescribed by the doctor 
25 20 25 0  
16 Don't know 20 21 11 -8 *** 
Significance of difference: *. 05 level, **.01 level, ***. 001 level  
Source: As in Appendix Table 1. 
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Appendix Table 3. STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH UNNECESSARY TESTING: 
TABULATION BY ADMINISTRATIVE CATEGORY 
Q.  What would you advise your friend to do if he thinks doctors in a public hospital 
are requiring him to do unnecessary diagnostic tests? (One answer) 
 
All  
County 
County-
level city 
Urban 
district 
Difference: 
urban-county 
                   (% respondents) 
7 Complain to the hospital 
administration 
4 7 11 7 *** 
6 Use connections to find 
another doctor 
5 6 7 2 * 
2 Pay the doctor extra 
money (hong bao) 
2 2 2 0  
2 Go to a private hospital 
to get the tests done 
2 1 3 1  
12 Change to another public 
hospital 
13 12 11 -2  
20 Ask the doctor to keep 
the tests to the minimum 
20 19 19 -1  
30 Do the tests 
recommended by the 
doctor 
30 26 31 1  
6 Refuse the tests 6 7 5 -2 * 
16 Don't know 18 19 11 -7 *** 
Significance of difference: *. 05 level, **.01 level, ***. 001 level  
Source: As in Appendix Table 1. 
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Appendix Table 4. STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH UNETHICAL SURGEON: 
TABULATION BY INFRASTRUCTURE LEVEL 
Q. If your friend needed a life-saving operation but the surgeon in a public hospital 
told them that he could not guarantee that the operation would be successful, what 
would you advise the patient to do? (One answer). 
  
Infrastructure: number of utilities 
 
 
All  
None One Two Three 
Difference: 
three-none 
                          (% respondents) 
4 Complain to the hospital 
administration 
4 4 3 4 0  
10 Use connections to find 
another surgeon 
5 5 9 16 10 *** 
4 Pay the surgeon extra 
money (hong bao) 
2 3 4 4 2  
4 Go to a private hospital 
for better treatment 
2 3 5 4 2  
27 Change to another public 
hospital 
17 23 29 30 13 *** 
4 Ask the surgeon to take 
special care 
5 4 5 4 -1  
32 Undergo the operation at 
own risk 
48 34 30 27 -20 *** 
16 Don’t know 16 24 16 9 -7 *** 
Significance of difference: *. 05 level, ***. 001 level  
Source: As in Appendix Table 1. 
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Appendix Table 5. STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH OVER-PRESCRIPTION: 
TABULATION BY INFRASTRUCTURE LEVEL 
Q. What would you advise your friend to do if the doctor at a public hospital prescribes 
a lot of expensive medication which is not covered by insurance even when cheaper 
alternatives are available? (One answer) 
  
Infrastructure: number of utilities  
 
All  
None One Two Three 
Difference: 
three-none 
 
                               (% respondents) 
8 Complain to the hospital 
administration 
6 5 8 10 4 ** 
6 Use connections to find 
another doctor 
2 3 5 9 7 *** 
2 Pay the doctor extra money 
(hong bao) 
3 3 2 2 -1  
7 Go to a private hospital or 
pharmacy for the prescription 
8 5 9 6 -2  
13 Change to another public 
hospital 
10 13 14 14 4 * 
24 Ask the doctor to change the 
prescription 
26 22 23 25 -1  
24 Buy the medicine prescribed 
by the doctor 
27 25 22 24 -2  
17 Don't know 19 24 17 10 -10 *** 
Significance of difference: *. 05 level, ** .01 level, ***. 001 level 
Source: As in Appendix Table 1. 
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Appendix Table 6. STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH UNNECESSARY TESTING: 
TABULATION BY INFRASTRUCTURE LEVEL 
Q.  What would you advise your friend to do if he thinks doctors in a public hospital are 
requiring him to do unnecessary diagnostic tests? (One answer) 
  
Infrastructure: number of utilities  
All  
None One Two Three 
Difference: 
three-none 
 
                              (% respondents) 
7 Complain to the hospital 
administration 
6 4 7 9 3 * 
6 Use connections to find 
another doctor 
2 3 6 9 6 *** 
2 Pay the doctor extra money 
(hong bao) 
2 2 1 2 0  
2 Go to a private hospital to 
get the tests done 
2 2 3 2 0  
12 Change to another public 
hospital 
13 13 11 13 0  
20 Ask the doctor to keep the 
tests to the minimum 
18 18 22 19 2  
30 Do the tests recommended 
by the doctor 
34 29 25 33 -1  
16 Don't know 19 23 17 8 -11 *** 
6 Refuse the tests 5 6 7 5 0  
Significance of difference: *. 05 level,  ***. 001 level 
Source: As in Appendix Table 1. 
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Appendix Table 7. STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH UNETHICAL 
SURGEON: TABULATION BY GENDER 
Q. If your friend needed a life-saving operation but the surgeon in a public 
hospital told them that he could not guarantee that the operation would be 
successful, what would you advise the patient to do? (One answer). 
 
All  
Female Male 
Difference: 
male-female 
 
                   (% respondents) 
 
4 Complain to the 
hospital administration 
3 4 0   
10 Use connections to find 
another surgeon 
10 11 1   
4 Pay the surgeon extra 
money (hong bao) 
4 4 0   
4 Go to a private hospital 
for better treatment 
3 4 1   
27 Change to another 
public hospital 
26 28 1   
4 Ask the surgeon to take 
special care 
5 4 0   
32 Undergo the operation 
at own risk 
32 31 -1   
16 Don’t know 17 14 -3 ***  
Significance of difference: *. 05 level,  ***. 001 level   
Source: As in Appendix Table 1. 
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Appendix Table 8. STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH OVER-PRESCRIPTION: 
TABULATION BY GENDER 
Q. What would you advise your friend to do if the doctor at a public hospital 
prescribes a lot of expensive medication which is not covered by insurance even 
when cheaper alternatives are available? (One answer) 
 
All  
Female Male 
Difference: 
male-female 
 
                  (% respondents) 
8 Complain to the hospital 
administration 
8 8 0  
6 Use connections to find 
another doctor 
6 5 0  
2 Pay the doctor extra money 
(hong bao) 
2 2 0  
7 Go to a private hospital or 
pharmacy for the prescription 
7 7 0  
13 Change to another public 
hospital 
13 14 1  
24 Ask the doctor to change the 
prescription 
23 24 1  
24 Buy the medicine prescribed 
by the doctor 
23 25 2  
17 Don't know 18 15 -4 *** 
Significance of difference: *. 05 level,  ***. 001 level 
Source: As in Appendix Table 1. 
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Appendix Table 9. STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH UNNECESARY TESTING: 
TABULATION BY GENDER 
Q.  What would you advise your friend to do if he thinks doctors in a public hospital 
are requiring him to do unnecessary diagnostic tests? (One answer) 
 
All  
Female Male 
Difference: 
male-female 
 
                   (% respondents) 
 
7 Complain to the hospital 
administration 
6 8 1   
6 Use connections to find 
another doctor 
6 5 -1   
2 Pay the doctor extra money 
(hong bao) 
2 2 0   
2 Go to a private hospital to get 
the tests done 
2 2 -1   
12 Change to another public 
hospital 
12 13 1   
20 Ask the doctor to keep the 
tests to the minimum 
18 21 3 *  
30 Do the tests recommended by 
the doctor 
30 29 0   
6 Refuse the tests 6 6 0   
16 Don't know 17 14 -3 ***  
Significance of difference: *. 05 level,  ***. 001 level   
Source: As in Appendix Table 1. 
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Appendix Table 10. STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH UNETHICAL SURGEON: 
TABULATION BY AGE COHORT 
Q. If your friend needed a life-saving operation but the surgeon in a public hospital told 
them that he could not guarantee that the operation would be successful, what would 
you advise the patient to do? (One answer). 
 
 
All 
  
Born 
1940s, 
50s 
Born 
1960s, 
70s 
Born 
1980s, 
90s 
Difference: 
young-old 
                                                        (% respondents) 
 
4 Complain to the hospital 
administration  
3 4 4 1  
10 Use connections to find 
another surgeon  
7 10 12 5 *** 
4 Pay the surgeon extra 
money (hong bao)  
3 4 4 0  
4 Go to a private hospital for 
better treatment  
3 3 5 2 * 
27 Change to another public 
hospital  
21 25 33 11 *** 
4 Ask the surgeon to take 
special care  
3 5 5 2 * 
32 Undergo the operation at 
own risk  
36 33 28 -8 *** 
16 Don’t know 
 
24 16 10 -13 *** 
Significance of difference: *. 05 level,  ***. 001 level        
Source: As in Appendix Table 1. 
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Appendix Table 11. STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH OVER-PRESCRIPTION: 
TABULATION BY AGE COHORT 
Q. What would you advise your friend to do if the doctor at a public hospital 
prescribes a lot of expensive medication which is not covered by insurance even when 
cheaper alternatives are available? (One answer) 
 
 
All 
 
Born 
1940s, 
50s 
Born 
1960s, 
70s 
Born 
1980s, 
90s 
 
Difference: 
young-old 
 
   (% respondents)   
8 Complain to the hospital 
administration 
5 8 10 5 ***  
6 Use connections to find 
another doctor 
5 5 7 2 *  
2 Pay the doctor extra 
money (hong bao) 
2 2 2 0   
7 Go to a private hospital 
or pharmacy for the 
prescription 
7 7 7 0   
13 Change to another 
public hospital 
12 13 15 2   
24 Ask the doctor to 
change the prescription 
19 23 28 9 ***  
24 Buy the medicine 
prescribed by the doctor 
25 25 22 -3 *  
17 Don't know 25 17 10 -15 ***  
Significance of difference: *. 05 level,  ***. 001 level    
Source: As in Appendix Table 1. 
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Appendix Table 12. STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH UNNECESSARY TESTING: 
TABULATION BY AGE COHORT 
Q.  What would you advise your friend to do if he thinks doctors in a public hospital are 
requiring him to do unnecessary diagnostic tests? (One answer) 
 
 
All 
 
Born 
1940s, 
50s 
Born 
1960s, 
70s 
Born 
1980s, 
90s 
 
Difference: 
young-old 
 
  (% respondents)   
7 Complain to the hospital 
administration 
5 6 10 5 *** 
6 Use connections to find 
another doctor 
4 6 7 3 ** 
2 Pay the doctor extra 
money (hong bao) 
2 2 1 -1  
2 Go to a private hospital to 
get the tests done 
2 2 2 0  
12 Change to another public 
hospital 
11 12 13 2  
20 Ask the doctor to keep the 
tests to the minimum 
15 20 23 7 *** 
30 Do the tests recommended 
by the doctor 
30 31 28 -1  
16 Don't know 25 16 10 -16 *** 
6 Refuse the tests 5 6 6 1  
Significance of difference: *. 05 level,  **.01 level, ***. 001 level 
Source: As in Appendix Table 1. 
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Appendix Table 13. STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH UNETHICAL SURGEON: 
TABULATION BY EDUCATION 
Q. If your friend needed a life-saving operation but the surgeon in a public hospital told 
them that he could not guarantee that the operation would be successful, what would you 
advise the patient to do? (One answer). 
 
 
All 
 
Primary 
or less 
Junior 
high 
Senior 
high, 
technical 
University 
Difference: 
university-
primary 
                                (% respondents)  
4 Complain to the hospital 
administration 
3 3 5 5 2  
10 Use connections to find 
another surgeon 
6 10 11 20 14 *** 
4 Pay the surgeon extra 
money (hong bao) 
3 4 6 4 1  
4 Go to a private hospital 
for better treatment 
2 4 5 6 4 *** 
27 Change to another public 
hospital 
20 31 31 23 4  
4 Ask the surgeon to take 
special care 
4 5 4 6 1  
32 Undergo the operation at 
own risk 
35 31 29 30 -5 * 
16 Don’t know 27 14 10 6 -20 *** 
Significance of difference: *. 05 level,  ***. 001 level   
Source: As in Appendix Table 1. 
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Appendix Table 14. STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH OVER-PRESCRIPTION: 
TABULATION BY EDUCATION 
Q. What would you advise your friend to do if the doctor at a public hospital prescribes a lot 
of expensive medication which is not covered by insurance even when cheaper alternatives 
are available? (One answer) 
 
 
All 
 
Primary 
or less 
Junior 
high 
Senior 
high, 
technical 
University 
Difference: 
university-
primary 
                                            (% respondents) 
 
8 Complain to the hospital 
administration 
5 8 9 12 7 
*** 
6 Use connections to find 
another doctor 
3 6 6 11 7 
*** 
2 Pay the doctor extra 
money (hong bao) 
2 3 2 2 0 
 
7 Go to a private hospital 
or pharmacy for the 
prescription 
6 8 7 6 0 
 
13 Change to another public 
hospital 
12 14 15 10 -2 
 
24 Ask the doctor to change 
the prescription 
20 24 26 29 10 
*** 
24 Buy the medicine 
prescribed by the doctor 
25 24 23 21 -4 
* 
17 Don't know 27 14 11 8 -19 *** 
Significance of difference: *. 05 level,  ***. 001 level     
Source: As in Appendix Table 1. 
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Appendix Table 15. STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH UNNECESSARY TESTING: 
TABULATION BY EDUCATION 
Q.  What would you advise your friend to do if he thinks doctors in a public hospital are 
requiring him to do unnecessary diagnostic tests? (One answer) 
 
 
All 
 
Primary 
or less 
Junior 
high 
Senior 
high, 
technical 
University 
Difference: 
university-
primary 
                                  (% respondents)  
7 Complain to the hospital 
administration 
5 7 9 10 5 *** 
6 Use connections to find 
another doctor 
3 6 7 11 8 *** 
2 Pay the doctor extra money 
(hong bao) 
1 2 2 2 1  
2 Go to a private hospital to 
get the tests done 
2 3 2 2 0  
12 Change to another public 
hospital 
11 12 14 10 -1  
20 Ask the doctor to keep the 
tests to the minimum 
18 19 21 22 5 *** 
30 Do the tests recommended 
by the doctor 
29 31 29 32 3  
16 Don't know 26 15 9 6 -20 *** 
6 Refuse the tests 6 6 7 4 -2  
Significance of difference: *. 05 level,  **.01 level, ***. 001 level 
Source: As in Appendix Table 1. 
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Appendix Table 16. STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH UNETHICAL SURGEON: 
MEAN INCOMES 
Q. If your friend needed a life-saving operation but the surgeon in a public hospital 
told them that he could not guarantee that the operation would be successful, what 
would you advise the patient to do? (One answer). 
 
 
All  
 Mean h’hold 
income (1)  
Difference from 
mode (undergo 
operation)  
Significance(2) 
%  (thousand Yuan)  
4 Complain to the hospital 
administration 
61.3 14.5 ** 
10 Use connections to find 
another surgeon 
67.7 20.9 *** 
4 Pay the surgeon extra 
money (hong bao) 
63.3 16.5 * 
4 Go to a private hospital 
for better treatment 
85.8 39.0  
27 Change to another 
public hospital 
56.0 9.2 *** 
4 Ask the surgeon to take 
special care 
64.2 17.5 ** 
32 Undergo the operation 
at own risk 
46.8 0 -- 
16 Don’t know 44.4 -2.3  
(1) Includes pooled mean income for five imputations for the 26.3% of 
households not reporting their income.  Imputations based on education of the 
respondent and the maximum amount of money which the respondent thinks 
his/her household could access in an emergency. 
(2) Independent samples t-test comparing the mean income in each category to 
the modal category of “undergo the operation at own risk”: * significant at .05 
level, ** .01 level, *** .001 level. 
Source: As in Appendix Table 1. 
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Appendix Table 17. STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH OVER-PRESCRIPTION: 
MEAN INCOMES 
Q. What would you advise your friend to do if the doctor at a public hospital 
prescribes a lot of expensive medication which is not covered by insurance even when 
cheaper alternatives are available? (One answer) 
 
 
All  
 Mean 
h’hold 
income (1)  
Difference from 
mode (buy the 
medicine)  
 
 
Significance(2) 
%  (thousand Yuan)  
8 Complain to the hospital 
administration 
68.6 20.0 *** 
6 Use connections to find 
another doctor 
66.1 17.5 *** 
2 Pay the doctor extra 
money (hong bao) 
56.1 7.5  
7 Go to a private hospital or 
pharmacy for the 
prescription 
67.5 19.0  
13 Change to another public 
hospital 
53.9 5.3  
24 Ask the doctor to change 
the prescription 
57.1 8.5 *** 
24 Buy the medicine 
prescribed by the doctor 
48.6 0 -- 
17 Don't know 43.7 -4.9  
(1) Includes pooled mean income for five imputations for the 26.3% of 
households not reporting their income.  Imputations based on education of the 
respondent and the maximum amount of money which the respondent thinks 
his/her household could access in an emergency. 
(2) Independent samples t-test comparing the mean income in each category to 
the modal category of “buy the medicines prescribed by the doctor”: * 
significant at .05 level, ** .01 level, *** .001 level. 
Source: As in Appendix Table 1. 
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Appendix Table 18. STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH UNNECESSARY TESTING: 
MEAN INCOMES 
Q.  What would you advise your friend to do if he thinks doctors in a public hospital 
are requiring him to do unnecessary diagnostic tests? (One answer) 
 
All  
 Mean 
h’hold 
income (1)  
Difference 
from mode 
 (do the tests)  
Significance(2) 
%  (thousand Yuan)  
7 Complain to the hospital 
administration 
73.9 22.2 ** 
6 Use connections to find 
another doctor 
67.8 16.0 * 
2 Pay the doctor extra 
money (hong bao) 
57.7 5.9  
2 Go to a private hospital to 
get the tests done 
59.6 7.9  
12 Change to another public 
hospital 
53.3 1.5  
20 Ask the doctor to keep the 
tests to the minimum 
57.2 5.4  
30 Do the tests recommended 
by the doctor 
51.8 0 -- 
16 Don't know 43.9 -7.9  
6 Refuse the tests 52.7 0.9  
(1) Includes pooled mean income for five imputations for the 26.3% of 
households not reporting their income.  Imputations based on education of the 
respondent and the maximum amount of money which the respondent thinks 
his/her household could access in an emergency. 
(2) Independent samples t-test comparing the mean income in each category to 
the modal category of “do the tests recommended by the doctor”: * significant 
at .05 level, ** .01 level, *** .001 level. 
Source: As in Appendix Table 1. 
 
